The optimality of optimal punishments in Cournot supergames

The result of Colombo and Labrecciosa (2006) that optimal punishments are inferior to Nash-reversion trigger strategies with decreasing marginal costs is due to the output when a firm deviates from the punishment path being allowed to become negative.

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Year of publication:	2007-10
Authors:	Azacis, Helmuts ; Collie, David
Institutions:	Economics Section, Cardiff Business School
Subject:	Optimal punishments \| trigger strategies \| collusion \| cartels

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Cardiff Economics Working Papers. - ISSN 1749-6101.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Published in <i>Economics Letters</i>, Vol. 105, 2009, pp. 56-57. Number E2007/27 10 pages
Classification:	C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games ; D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection ; L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005162725