This is not another report on Other Transaction Authorities. In recent years, a multitude of reports have been written on the topic, and we do not intend to retread the same ground. But in our review of these reports, none have focused on the role of the consortia model despite consortia playing a pivotal role in high-profile Other Transactions (OTs), including the replacement for the Defense Travel System (DTS) and Operation Warp Speed. This report focuses on the value proposition consortia and the consortia model bring to the government acquisition process. Specifically, this report explores:The history and origin of consortia, the role of consortium management firms, the growth of consortia in recent years, to what extent the consortia model can enable collaboration, accelerate acquisition, promote innovation, and expand the defense industrial base, costs and risks associated with consortia, and recommendations for the way forward. As of May 2022, we identified 42 consortia supporting agreements: 38 with the Department of Defense (DoD) and four with other federal agencies. Twelve of these consortia provided data for this report. Over the course of our research, we found that the consortia model supports government acquisition efforts by promoting government–industry–academia communication, facilitating industry partnerships and collaboration, providing critical surge capacity to government acquisition, offering a ready, pre-established network of potential suppliers who have expertise in specific areas, and helping government program offices that do not have the requisite skill and experience in executing OTs. We also found that consortia help expand the defense innovation base by bringing nontraditional defense contractors and small businesses into that base. The consortia model is not a silver bullet for all acquisition; it is one tool in a full toolbox that when used properly, can provide real benefits to the government. However, not all instances of the consortia model are created equal. It is incumbent upon the government acquisition workforce to know when and how to use and manage consortia—and to not become overly reliant on the consortia model to the extent that the acquisition workforce loses critical core competencies of conducting acquisition. There is a wealth of data available at the consortia level that can be leveraged to gain insight into and more effectively manage consortia, but DoD has not taken the necessary steps to fully benefit from this data. A word of caution. In part to safeguard the interests of taxpayers and the government, there is a powerful impulse to impose a robust statutory, regulatory, and policy regime to prevent against potential acquisition workforce errors, waste, or even fraud. We support transparency and oversight and have included in this report recommendations to promote these two important policy goals. At the same time, we caution against legislation and regulation that undermine the value proposition of the consortia model and OTs. Like much of government acquisition, the ability of DoD and other government agencies to leverage consortia (and to ensure proper oversight) depends primarily on the capabilities and expertise of the acquisition workforce, creating the right incentives, and striking the delicate balance between oversight and flexibility so as not to under-mine the value proposition of consortia. To that end, in the last section of the report we provide seven specific recommendations for the consortia model’s way forward: Improve visibility and transparency Enhance training and develop best practices Focus on transitioning technology to production Avoid additional regulatory burdens Preserve the definition of nontraditional defense contractor Promote collaboration and innovation through flexibility Expand the use of other transaction authorities
