The power of renegotiation and monitoring in software outsourcing : substitutes or complements?
Year of publication: |
2021
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Authors: | Huang, He ; Hu, Minhui ; Kauffman, Robert J. ; Xu, Hongyan |
Published in: |
Information systems research : ISR. - Catonsville, MD : INFORMS, ISSN 1047-7047, ZDB-ID 1081934-4. - Vol. 32.2021, 4, p. 1236-1261
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Subject: | incentives | incomplete contract | monitoring | renegotiation | software outsourcing | software reliability | Software | Outsourcing | Unvollständiger Vertrag | Incomplete contract | Softwareentwicklung | Software development | Softwareindustrie | Software industry | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Vertrag | Contract | Lieferantenmanagement | Supplier relationship management | Verhandlungstheorie | Bargaining theory | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory | Betriebliches Informationssystem | Business intelligence system | Verhandlungen | Negotiations |
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