The Private Provision of Public Goods via Dominant Assurance Contracts.

Many types of public goods can be produced privately by profit-seeking entrepreneurs using a modified form of assurance contract, called a dominant assurance contract. The author models the dominant assurance contract as a game and shows that the pure strategy equilibrium has agents contributing to the public good as a dominant strategy. The game is also modeled under incomplete information as a Bayesian-Nash game. Copyright 1998 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

MoreLess

Year of publication:	1998
Authors:	Tabarrok, Alexander
Published in:	Public Choice. - Springer. - Vol. 96.1998, 3-4, p. 345-62
Publisher:	Springer

More details

Extent:	text/html
Type of publication:	Article
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005709159