The Pro-collusive Effect of Increasing the Repose Period for Price Fixing Agreements

Intuitively, extending the period of repose for price fixing agreements enhances the effectiveness of competition policy enforcement. This paper proves this intuition wrong. As extending the repose period reduces cartel members' defection payoff while it leaves unaltered expected compliance profits, it induces cartels to be more stable internally.

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Year of publication:	2007
Authors:	Hinloopen, Jeroen
Published in:	Contributions to Economic Analysis & Policy. - Berkeley Electronic Press. - Vol. 7.2007, 1, p. 1135-1135
Publisher:	Berkeley Electronic Press
Subject:	cartel stability \| detection probabilities \| statue of limitation

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Extent:	application/pdf
Type of publication:	Article
Notes:	oai:bepress:bejeap-1135
Classification:	K21 - Antitrust Law
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005086829