The Pro-collusive Effect of Increasing the Repose Period for Price Fixing Agreements

Abstract Intuitively, extending the period of repose for price fixing agreements enhances the effectiveness of competition policy enforcement. This paper proves this intuition wrong. As extending the repose period reduces cartel members' defection payoff while it leaves unaltered expected compliance profits, it induces cartels to be more stable internally.

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Year of publication:	2007
Authors:	Hinloopen, Jeroen
Published in:	The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy. - De Gruyter, ISSN 1935-1682, ZDB-ID 2268326-4. - Vol. 7.2007, 1
Publisher:	De Gruyter
Subject:	cartel stability \| detection probabilities \| statue of limitation

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Type of publication:	Article
Type of publication (narrower categories):	research-article
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	10.2202/1935-1682.1135 [DOI]
Source:	Other ZBW resources

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