The relation between earnings-based measures in firm debt contracts and CEO pay sensitivity to earnings
Year of publication: |
February 2016
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Authors: | Rhodes, Adrienne |
Published in: |
Journal of accounting & economics. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0165-4101, ZDB-ID 441330-1. - Vol. 61.2016, 1, p. 1-22
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Subject: | Executive compensation | Debt contracts | Covenants | Agency costs | Führungskräfte | Managers | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Vergütungssystem | Compensation system | Managervergütung | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory | Leistungsentgelt | Performance pay | Lohn | Wages | Fremdkapital | Debt financing | Vertrag | Contract | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Corporate Governance | Corporate governance |
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