The Relationship between Internal Audit Assurance Frequency and Earnings Manipulation Intent and Behavior : A Theory of Planned Behavior Approach

This study uses Ajzen's (1991) theory of planned behavior (TPB) to examine whether the internal audit function's use of continuous auditing affects managers intent and actual behavior related to earnings manipulation. I conduct an experiment where 265 corporate managers assume the role of a divisional vice president incentivized by an annual bonus based on divisional performance. At midyear, participants signal their intent and actual earnings manipulation behavior in a setting where the division is on target to miss the annualized earnings target if the manager does nothing. Consistent with theory, univariate analyses suggest that managers who indicate higher perceptions on each of the three TPB elements were more likely to manipulate earnings. Multivariate analyses support a positive relationship between each measure and earnings manipulation intent, however, the attitudes measure is statistically insignificant. Related to actual behavior, I predict and find that managers who intend to manipulate earnings actually do so. Further, I find that participants who intend to manipulate earnings prefer to use accounting estimates relative to accounting expenditures as their earnings manipulation mechanism in this setting. In additional analyses, I find managers with current or prior audit committee experience were less likely to manipulate earnings. Lastly, I find that managers are indeed less likely to manipulate earnings when the internal audit function uses continuous auditing. This study contributes to knowledge by disentangling earnings manipulation intent from actual behavior. Results of the study should be of interest to auditors, academics, and financial statement preparers