The Revelation and Delegation Principles in Common Agency Games

In the context of common agency adverse-selection games weillustrate that the revelation principle cannot be applied to studyequilibria of the multi-principal games. We then demonstrate thatan extension of the taxation principle – what we term the“delegation principle” – can be used to characterize the set of allcommon agency equilibria.

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Year of publication:	2001
Authors:	Martimort, David ; Stole, Lars
Institutions:	CESifo
Subject:	revelation principle \| delegation principle \| taxationprinciple \| common agency \| adverse selection

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	CESifo Working Paper Series.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Number 575
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005406408