The revelation principle does not always hold when strategies of agents are costly
Year of publication: |
2018-08-01
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Authors: | Wu, Haoyang |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
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Language: | English |
Notes: | Wu, Haoyang (2018): The revelation principle does not always hold when strategies of agents are costly. |
Classification: | D71 - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations ; D8 - Information and Uncertainty |
Source: | BASE |
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