The robustness of robust implementation

We show that a mechanism that robustly implements optimal outcomes in a one-dimensional supermodular environment continues to robustly implement Îµ-optimal outcomes in all close-by environments. Robust implementation of Îµ-optimal outcomes is thus robust to small perturbations of the environment. This is in contrast to ex-post implementation which is not robust in this sense as only trivial social choice functions are ex-post implementable in generic environments.

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Year of publication:	2011
Authors:	Meyer-ter-Vehn, Moritz ; Morris, Stephen
Published in:	Journal of Economic Theory. - Elsevier, ISSN 0022-0531. - Vol. 146.2011, 5, p. 2093-2104
Publisher:	Elsevier
Keywords:	Robust implementation Ex-post implementation Social choice correspondence Belief-dependent outcomes

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Type of publication:	Article
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009318602