The role of information in contests

Consider a contest for a prize in which each player knows his/her own ability, but may or may not know those of his/her rivals (the complete or incomplete information regimes). Our main result is that, if the value of the prize is high, more effort and output are engendered under incomplete information, whereas, if the value is low, that distinction goes to complete information.

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Year of publication:	2013
Authors:	Dubey, Pradeep
Published in:	Economics Letters. - Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765. - Vol. 120.2013, 2, p. 160-163
Publisher:	Elsevier
Subject:	Contests \| Prizes \| Information \| Nash equilibrium

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Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	C70 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory. General ; C72 - Noncooperative Games ; C79 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory. Other ; D44 - Auctions ; D63 - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10010678824