The role of social and technical excludability for the success of impure public good and common pool agreements : the case of international fisheries
Year of publication: |
2020
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Authors: | Finus, Michael ; Schneider, Raoul ; Pintassilgo, Pedro |
Published in: |
Resource and energy economics. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0928-7655, ZDB-ID 1153616-0. - Vol. 59.2020, p. 1-21
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Subject: | Pure and impure public goods and common pool resources | Technical and socially constructed non-excludability | Benefit-cost duality of public goods and common pool resources | Property rights | Shared fish stocks | Regional fisheries management organizations | Free-riding | Öffentliche Güter | Public goods | Gemeingüter | Commons | Theorie | Theory | Fischereiressourcen | Fishery resources | Fischerei | Fisheries |
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