The Sequential Prisoner's Dilemma: Evidence on Reciprocation.
We investigate how fairness concerns influence individual behaviour in social dilemmas. Using a Sequential Prisoner's Dilemma experiment we analyse the extent to which co-operation is conditional on first-mover co-operation, repetition, economic incentives, subject pool (United Kingdom vs. United States) and gender. We find the most important variable influencing co-operation is the first-mover's choice, supporting the argument that co-operative behaviour in social dilemmas reflects reciprocation rather than unconditional altruism. However, we also find that cooperation decreases with repetition, and reciprocation falls as its material cost rises.
Year of publication: |
2001
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Authors: | Clark, Kenneth ; Sefton, Martin |
Published in: |
Economic Journal. - Royal Economic Society - RES, ISSN 1468-0297. - Vol. 111.2001, 468, p. 51-68
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Publisher: |
Royal Economic Society - RES |
Saved in:
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