The Shapley Value as a Guide to FRAND Licensing Agreements

We consider the problem faced by standard-setting organizations of specifying Fair, Reasonable And Non-Discriminatory agreements. Along with Layne-Farrar, Padilla and Schmalensee (2007), we model the problem as a cooperative game with transferable utility, allowing for patents that have substitutes. Assuming that a value has been assigned to these "weak" patents, we obtain a formula for the Shapley value that gives an insight into what FRAND agreements could look like

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Year of publication:	2015
Authors:	Dehez, Pierre
Other Persons:	Poukens, Sophie (contributor)
Publisher:	[2015]: [S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Shapley-Wert \| Shapley value \| Kooperatives Spiel \| Cooperative game \| Theorie \| Theory \| Lizenz \| Licence \| Transferierbarer Nutzen \| Transferable utility \| Patent

Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (25 p)
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	In: Review of Law and Economics 10, 2014, 265-284 Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments May 11, 2014 erstellt
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10013022910