The stability of international environmental coalitions with farsighted countries: Some theoretical observations

We study a three-country model of international environmental agreements where countries may choose either to limit their emissions or to behave noncooperatively. First, we provide a taxonomy of various kinds of strategic situations. Then, by applying some recently developed game-theoretic techniques, we show that if countries are "farsighted" then there is scope for self-enforcing cooperation in several such situations.

MoreLess

Year of publication:	1997
Authors:	Ecchia, Giulio ; Mariotti, Marco
Publisher:	Milano : Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
Subject:	Umweltabkommen \| Spieltheorie \| Gefangenendilemma \| Theorie

More details

Series:	Nota di Lavoro ; 14.1997
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	hdl:10419/154778 [Handle]
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011608288