The Strategic Use of Tying to Preserve and Create Market Power in Evolving Industries
This article investigates how the tying of complementary products can be used to preserve and create monopoly positions. We first show how a monopolist of a product in the current period can use tying to preserve its monopoly in the future. We then show how a monopolist in one market can employ tying to extend its monopoly into a newly emerging market. Our analysis explains how a dominant firm can use tying to remain dominant in an industry undergoing rapid technological change. The analysis focuses on entry costs and network externalities. We also relate our analysis to the Microsoft case.
Year of publication: |
2002
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Authors: | Carlton, Dennis W. ; Waldman, Michael |
Published in: |
RAND Journal of Economics. - The RAND Corporation, ISSN 0741-6261. - Vol. 33.2002, 2, p. 194-220
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Publisher: |
The RAND Corporation |
Saved in:
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