The Tenuous Relationship between Effort and Performance Pay

When a worker is offered performance related pay, the incentive effect is not only determined by the shape of the incentive contract, but also by the probability of contract enforcement. We show that weaker enforcement may reduce the worker's effort, but lead to higher-powered incentive contracts. This creates a seemingly negative relationship between effort and performance pay

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Year of publication:	2012
Authors:	Kvaloy, Ola
Other Persons:	Olsen, Trond E. (contributor)
Publisher:	[2012]: [S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Leistungsentgelt \| Performance pay \| Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie \| Agency theory \| Moral Hazard \| Moral hazard \| Leistungsanreiz \| Performance incentive \| Arbeitsintensität \| Labour intensity

Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (29 p)
Series:	NHH Dept. of Finance & Management Science Discussion Paper ; No. 2012/8
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments June 29, 2012 erstellt
Other identifiers:	10.2139/ssrn.2103614 [DOI]
Classification:	J30 - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs. General
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013103919