The Theory of Transaction in Institutional Economics : A History

Cover -- Half Title -- Series Page -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Dedication Page -- Contents -- Preface -- The roadmap -- 1 Mapping the meaning of "transaction" -- 1.1. The ideas of transaction in Coase (1937) and (1960) -- 1.2. John Commons's formulation of transaction -- 1.3. Each transaction is "coercive" - the contribution of Robert Lee Hale to transactional theory -- 1.4. The "specific" transaction à la Williamson -- 2 The three dimensions of a transaction -- 2.1. The concept of transaction in the textbook perfect competition context -- 2.2. Introducing the legal dimension of a transaction -- 2.3. Introducing the competitive dimension of a transaction -- 2.4. Introducing the political dimension of a transaction -- 2.5. What should be next? Go back to the past -- 3 The legal dimension of transactions -- 3.1. The adversarial (or "positional") nature of legal positions -- 3.2. Positional goods: a primer -- 3.3. Freedom as a positional good -- 3.4. The inevitable costs of defining rights -- 4 The competitive dimension of transactions -- 4.1. The role of the outside market in the emergence of holdup risk -- 4.2. Oliver Hart's assignment of residual control rights -- 4.3. Oliver Williamson's fundamental transformation -- 4.4. The "trade-off" between Hart and Williamson: a reappraisal of the General Motors-Fisher Body case -- 4.5. The road ahead: reconciling Hart with Williamson -- 5 The political dimension of transactions -- 5.1. The political argument over corporate governance -- 5.2. The role of labour protection policies -- 5.3. The role of competition policies -- 5.4. The role of innovation policies -- 5.5. Blockholding and politics -- 6 Concluding remarks and one (just one, but remarkable) research proposal -- References -- Index.