The Timing of Multilateral Lending

Bargaining over the terms of multilateral lending can be a prolonged process. We model failure to come to quick agreement as a screening device. Policy makers who find conditionality especially costly delay to signal their type. We show that increased costs to not reaching agreement, whether borne by borrowers or lenders, can increase the chances of delay

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Year of publication:	2000
Authors:	Sibert, Anne C. ; Perraudin, William R. M.
Publisher:	[S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Theorie \| Theory \| Internationale Staatsschulden \| International sovereign debt \| Welt \| World \| Entwicklungsländer \| Developing countries \| IWF-Kredit \| IMF lending \| Zeitökonomie \| Economy of time \| Entwicklungsfinanzierung \| Development finance \| Entwicklungsorganisation \| Development organization
Description of contents:	Abstract [papers.ssrn.com]

Extent:	1 Online-Ressource
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	In: The Economic Journal, Vol. 110, Issue 460, January 2000 Volltext nicht verfügbar
Classification:	F34 - International Lending and Debt Problems
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10014153154