The Uneasy Move from Autonomy to Alternatives : Self-Determination, Regret, and the Process of Autonomous Choice

In “The Choice Theory of Contracts” Hanoch Dagan and Michael Heller argue for personal autonomy as contracts' ultimate value. Like similar attempts to base contracts on self-determination, Dagan and Heller focus their attention on the existence of meaningful alternatives for individuals to choose from. In this paper I argue, that quickly turning from personal autonomy to alternatives leaves a significant gap. In particular, Choice Theories, and theories like it, fail to address the process of choice and the conditions for making it conducive for personal autonomy.The paper offers an initial step towards filling this gap. First, it develops the idea of the autonomous choice process as predicated on individuals' engagement with inner deliberation. Second, it discusses the psychology of choice as one avenue of research into the process the autonomous choice. In particular, I argue that anticipated regret is a primary motivator for engagement in inner deliberation. Having established the relation between personal autonomy and regret I discuss two of its main implications. First, recognizing regret as integral to autonomous choice resolves the apparent paradox of fostering personal autonomy by enforcing promises. In other words of advancing self-determination by denying individuals the ability to withdraw from contracts and rewrite their life story. Second, the link between personal autonomy and regret explains some of the boundaries of contract law, such as the unenforceability of promises to marry