The Use of Information in Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring.

The present paper formalizes the idea that improved monitoring helps coordination in long-term relationships. Specifically, the pure-strategy sequential equilibrium payoff set is shown to expand (in the sense of set inclusion) in repeated games with imperfect monitoring when the quality of the signal improves in Blackwell's sense. Furthermore, the directions of the expansion are identified. Copyright 1992 by The Review of Economic Studies Limited.

MoreLess

Year of publication:	1992
Authors:	Kandori, Michihiro
Published in:	Review of Economic Studies. - Wiley Blackwell, ISSN 0034-6527. - Vol. 59.1992, 3, p. 581-93
Publisher:	Wiley Blackwell

More details

Extent:	application/pdf
Type of publication:	Article
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005242826