The value of repeated games with an informed controller

We consider the general model of zero-sum repeated games (or stochastic games with signals), and assume that one of the players is fully informed and controls the transitions of the state variable. We prove the existence of the uniform value, generalizing several results of the literature. A preliminary existence result is obtained for a certain class of stochastic games played with pure strategies.

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Year of publication:	2008-07
Authors:	Renault, Jérôme
Institutions:	Université Paris-Dauphine (Paris IX)
Subject:	Wasserstein distance \| Choquet order \| single controller \| Repeated games \| uniform value \| incomplete information \| stochastic games

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Series:	Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Classification:	C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games ; D81 - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10010708801