The way in which an experiment is conducted is unbelievably Important: on the experimentation practices of economists and psychologists
Year of publication: |
2009
|
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Authors: | Ortmann, Andreas |
Publisher: |
Munich : Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |
Subject: | Duhem-Quine problem | experimental design | experimental implementation | financial incentives | deception |
Series: | CESifo Working Paper ; 2887 |
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Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Type of publication (narrower categories): | Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Other identifiers: | 617139792 [GVK] hdl:10419/30645 [Handle] |
Source: |
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