Third- and higher-price auctions

This paper solves the equilibrium bid functions of third- and higher-price auctions for a large class of distribution functions of bidders' valuations, assuming the symmetric independent private values framework, and risk neutrality. In all these auctions, equilibrium bids exceed bidders' valuations, and bidders raise their bids when one moves to a higher price auction, and lower bids when the number of bidders is increased.

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Year of publication:	1995
Authors:	Wolfstetter, Elmar
Publisher:	Berlin : Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes
Subject:	auctions \| procurement

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Series:	SFB 373 Discussion Paper ; 1996,3
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	72762170X [GVK] hdl:10419/66241 [Handle] RePEc:zbw:sfb373:19963 [RePEc]
Classification:	D44 - Auctions ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; H57 - Procurement ; C72 - Noncooperative Games
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010310759