Three Theorems on Non-Emptiness of Approximate Cores: Part 1. Game Theoretic Results

We introduce the framework of parametrized collections of games and provide three nonemptiness of approximate core theorems for arbitrary games without (and with) sidepayments. The framework and theorems are sufficiently general to encompass results in the literature on nonemptiness of approximate cores of games derived from pregames. The theorems are based on a new notion of strongly balanced profiles and approximately strongly balanced profiles.

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Year of publication:	1997
Authors:	Kovalenkov, A. ; Wooders, M.H.
Institutions:	Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona
Subject:	GAMES

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Series:	UFAE and IAE Working Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	32 pages
Classification:	C6 - Mathematical Methods and Programming ; D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005572251