Three-types models of multidimensional screening

This paper analyzes the variety of optimal screening contracts in a relatively simple multidimensional framework a` la Armstrong and Rochet (1999), when only three types of agents are present. It is shown, among other things, that the well known principle in optimal contract theory of `no distortion at the top' does not carry over to the multidimensional case

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Year of publication:	2005-10
Authors:	Brighi, Luigi ; D'Amato, Marcello
Institutions:	Dipartimento di Economia "Marco Biagi", Università degli Studi di Modena e Reggio Emilia
Subject:	Asymmmetric information \| multidimensional screening \| optimal contract

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Department of Economics.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	pages 24
Classification:	D58 - Computable and Other Applied General Equilibrium Models ; L51 - Economics of Regulation
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008517824