Timing and Virtual Observability in Ultimatum Bargaining and "Weak Link" Coordination Games
Year of publication: |
2004
|
---|---|
Authors: | Weber, Roberto A. ; Camerer, Colin F. ; Knez, Marc |
Published in: |
Experimental economics : a journal of the Economic Science Association. - Dordrecht [u.a.] : Springer Science + Business Media B.V, ISSN 1386-4157, ZDB-ID 13864518. - Vol. 7.2004, 1, p. 25-48
|
Saved in:
Saved in favorites
Similar items by person
-
Timing and Virtual Observability in Ultimatum Bargaining and Weak Link Coordination Games
Camerer, Colin F., (1996)
-
Weber, Roberto A., (1996)
-
Timing and virtual observability in ultimatum bargaining and "weak link" coordination games
Weber, Roberto A., (2004)
- More ...