To free ride or not to free ride? Role of patterning and feedback in the public goods game

We study a public goods game where subjects get feedback either continually or intermittently. We find that the intermittent feedback helps to mitigate problems of free riding because subjects in this treatment focus more on a string of choices rather than deciding on a case by case basis as in the continuous feedback treatment.

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Year of publication:	2003
Authors:	Chaudhuri, Ananish ; Chen, DeeDee ; Graziano, Sara ; McIntire, Frances ; Winkler, Dawn
Publisher:	Wellesley, MA : Wellesley College, Department of Economics
Subject:	Öffentliches Gut \| Spieltheorie \| Trittbrettfahrerverhalten \| Experiment \| Public Goods ; Voluntary Contributions Mechanism ; Patterned Feedback ; Free riding ; Expectations

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Series:	Wellesley College Working Paper ; 2003-02
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	378805673 [GVK] hdl:10419/23220 [Handle]
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; C92 - Laboratory; Group Behavior ; C91 - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010263249