To reward the best or to punish the worst? : a comparison of two tournament mechanisms with heterogeneous agents
Year of publication: |
2012
|
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Authors: | Balafoutas, Loukas ; Dutcher, Glenn ; Lindner, Florian ; Ryvkin, Dmitry |
Publisher: |
Innsbruck : Dep. of Economics (Inst. für Wirtschaftstheorie und Wirtschaftsgeschichte) Innsbruck : Dep. of Public Finance (Inst. für Finanzwiss.) Innsbruck : Dep. of Statistics (Inst. für Statistik) |
Subject: | Leistungsentgelt | Performance pay | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Theorie | Theory | Wettkampf | Belohnung | Strafe | Vertrag |
Extent: | 21 S. |
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Series: | Working papers in economics and statistics. - Innsbruck, ISSN 1993-4378, ZDB-ID 2316935-7. - Vol. 2012,08 |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Type of publication (narrower categories): | Arbeitspapier ; Working Paper ; Graue Literatur ; Non-commercial literature |
Language: | English |
Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
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