Too Good to Be True? Imperfection as a Costly Signal of Authenticity

A large body of research shows that tastes can reliably signal social group membership. Because standards of good taste vary between groups, the costs of acquiring them prevents dishonest signaling by outsiders. However, little research has examined signals of good taste within social groups, where standards and ratings of good taste are common knowledge and acquisition costs cannot ensure honesty. Five studies show that when simulating good taste is easy, observers make inferences about others' authenticity directly from their consumption choices. Perceptions that an individual has made good choices increase monotonically with a greater proportion of high-rated options, but perceptions of their authenticity decrease monotonically. Relative to choosing uniformly good options, some bad choices can signal that one's choices reflect authentic preference rather than pretense. Accordingly, judgments that an individual can independently discern good options from bad, and the desire to socialize with them and seek their recommendations, are non-monotonic and highest when they make a few bad choices. Only when good choices are thought to reflect authentic motives do they effectively signal good taste