Tournament mechanism in wine-grape contracts : evidence from a French wine cooperative
M'hand Fares and Luis Orozco
| Year of publication: |
2014
|
|---|---|
| Authors: | Farès, M'hand ; Orozco, Luis |
| Published in: |
Journal of wine economics. - New York, NY : Cambridge Univ. Press, ISSN 1931-4361, ZDB-ID 2520377-0. - Vol. 9.2014, 3, p. 320-345
|
| Subject: | cooperative | quality | tournament | wine grape supply contracts | Frankreich | France | Weinbau | Wine industry | Wein | Wine | Vertrag | Contract | Produktqualität | Product quality | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory | Agrargenossenschaft | Agricultural cooperative | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Extensives Spiel | Extensive form game | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory |
| Extent: | graph. Darst. |
|---|---|
| Type of publication: | Article |
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010493644