Tournaments and Multiple Productive Inputs : The Case of Performance Enhancing Drugs

In this paper I consider the desirability of drugs that enhance cognitive abilities in the context of tournaments that are used as optimal labor contracts as in Lazear and Rosen (1981). Such drugs reduce the number of voluntary participants in a tournament, but increase individual and total output. If the tournament is optimally designed, welfare is higher if drugs are available and used

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Year of publication:	[2021]
Authors:	Konrad, Kai A.
Publisher:	[S.l.] : SSRN

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (15 p)
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments November 2005 erstellt
Other identifiers:	10.2139/ssrn.857244 [DOI]
Classification:	D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legistures, and Voting Behavior ; D74 - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances ; L23 - Organization of Production ; M54 - Labor Management (team formation, worker empowerment, job design, tasks and authority, job satisfaction)
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013318136