Tournaments as a response to ambiguity aversion in incentive contracts
Year of publication: |
September 2015
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Authors: | Kellner, Christian |
Published in: |
Journal of economic theory. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0022-0531, ZDB-ID 410539-4. - Vol. 159.2015, p. 627-655
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Subject: | Ambiguity aversion | Incentive contracts | Tournaments | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Risikoaversion | Risk aversion | Entscheidung unter Unsicherheit | Decision under uncertainty | Vertrag | Contract | Extensives Spiel | Extensive form game | Leistungsentgelt | Performance pay | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory | Experiment |
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