Trade Policy Determinants and Trade Reform in a Developing Country

In this paper, I start out with a standard political economy of trade policy model to measure the determinants of trade policy in a developing country. I carefully test the model empirically with Colombian data from 1983 to 1998 accounting for endogeneity and omitted variable bias concerns and then expand it in several directions.. I show that it is important to control for the impact of a drastic trade reform shock that affects all sectors and disentangle its effect from preferential trade agreements (PTAs). I find that protection is higher in sectors that are important exports for preferential partners which may be seen as a stumbling effect of PTAs for Colombia. I also relax the assumption of fixed political weights that measure the extra importance of producers' welfare relative to consumers in the government objective. I measure the impact of sectoral characteristics on tariffs indirectly through political weights as a novel alternative to nonstructurally estimating them as determinants of protection. Accordingly, I obtain more realistic estimates for the political weights further contributing to the literature.