Trade policy-making in a model of legislative bargaining
Year of publication: |
2013
|
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Authors: | Celik, Levent ; Karabay, Bilgehan ; McLaren, John |
Published in: |
Journal of international economics. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0022-1996, ZDB-ID 120143-8. - Vol. 91.2013, 2, p. 179-190
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Subject: | Trade policy | Multilateral legislative bargaining | Political economy | Distributive politics | Außenwirtschaftspolitik | Foreign economic policy | Verhandlungstheorie | Bargaining theory | Interessenpolitik | Lobbying | Verhandlungen | Negotiations | Gesetzgebung | Legislation | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice | Politische Entscheidung | Political decision |
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