Transportation and storage under a dynamic price cap regulation process

We study the welfare effects of Price Cap Regulation (PCR) and the strategic behavior it may induce in gas transportation networks by analyzing a stylized gas network within the framework of a multi-period game model under three scenarios: No regulation, a dynamic setting where the price cap adjustment mechanism is not endogenized by the players, and a dynamic setting where it is endogenized by the players.

MoreLess

Year of publication:	2012
Authors:	Breton, Michèle ; Kharbach, Mohammed
Published in:	Energy Economics. - Elsevier, ISSN 0140-9883. - Vol. 34.2012, 4, p. 918-929
Publisher:	Elsevier
Subject:	Gas market \| Dynamic game \| Price cap regulation

More details

Type of publication:	Article
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010576119