Trust, communication and contracts: Experimental evidence

We introduce opportunities for pre-play communication and to enter binding or non-binding contracts in trust games, and find (a) communication increases trusting and trustworthiness, (b) contracts are unnecessary for trusting and trustworthy behaviors and are eschewed by many players, (c) more trusting leads to higher earnings, and (d) both trustors and trustees favor “fair and efficient” proposals over the unequal proposals predicted by theory.

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Year of publication:	2006
Authors:	Ben-Ner, Avner ; Putterman, Louis
Publisher:	Providence, RI : Brown University, Department of Economics
Subject:	Vertrauen \| Spieltheorie \| trust game \| trust \| trustworthiness \| reciprocity \| Commitment \| communication

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Series:	Working Paper ; 2006-23
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	522873898 [GVK] hdl:10419/80126 [Handle]
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; C91 - Laboratory, Individual Behavior ; D63 - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010318895