Truth-telling and Trust in Sender-receiver Games with Intervention

Recent experimental studies find excessive truth-telling in strategic information transmission games with conflictive preferences. In this paper, we show that this phenomenon is more pronounced in sender-receiver games where a truthful regulator randomly intervenes. We also establish that intervention significantly increases the excessive trust of receivers.

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Year of publication:	2011-09
Authors:	Saglam, Ismail ; Gurdal, Mehmet Y. ; Ozdogan, Ayca
Institutions:	İktisat Bölümü, İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi
Subject:	Strategic information transmission \| truth-telling \| trust \| sender-receiver game

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Koç University-TUSIAD Economic Research Forum Working Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	32 pages
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; C90 - Design of Experiments. General ; D83 - Search, Learning, Information and Knowledge
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009323072