Truthful germs are contagious : a local-to-global characterization of truthfulness
Year of publication: |
2014
|
---|---|
Authors: | Archer, Aaron ; Kleinberg, Robert |
Published in: |
Games and economic behavior. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0899-8256, ZDB-ID 1002944-8. - Vol. 86.2014, p. 340-366
|
Subject: | Truthful mechanism design | Implementation theory | Incentive compatibility | Local-to-global characterization | Multi-dimensional types | Cyclic monotonicity | Weak monotonicity | Vortex-freeness | Truthful stitching | Rochet's theorem | Stokes's theorem | Saks-Yu theorem | First-order logic | Orthogonal polynomials | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Mechanism design | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Auktionstheorie | Auction theory | Soziale Wohlfahrtsfunktion | Social welfare function |
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