Tullock contests may be revenue superior to auctions in a symmetric setting
Alexander Matros, Alex Possajennikov
| Year of publication: |
May 2016
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|---|---|
| Authors: | Matros, Alexander ; Possajennikov, Alexandre |
| Published in: |
Economics letters. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765, ZDB-ID 717210-2. - Vol. 142.2016, p. 74-77
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| Subject: | Common value | Contests | Auctions | Auktionstheorie | Auction theory | Auktion | Auction | Rent-Seeking | Rent seeking | Einnahmen | Revenue | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Nichtkooperatives Spiel | Noncooperative game |
| Type of publication: | Article |
|---|---|
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Other identifiers: | 10.1016/j.econlet.2016.03.003 [DOI] |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011616688