Two extensions of the Shapley value for cooperative games

Two extensions of the Shapley value are given. First we consider a probabilistic framework in which certain consistent allocation rules such as the Shapley value are characterized. The second generalization of the Shapley value is an extension to the structure of posets by means of a recursive form. In the latter setting, the Shapley value for quasi-concave games is shown to be a core-allocation. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2001

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Year of publication:	2001
Authors:	Driessen, T. S. H. ; Paulusma, D.
Published in:	Mathematical Methods of Operations Research. - Springer. - Vol. 53.2001, 1, p. 35-49
Publisher:	Springer
Subject:	cooperative game \| poset \| probability distribution \| Shapley value \| 1991 Mathematics Subject Classifications: 90D12

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Type of publication:	Article
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

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