Two Families of Values for Global Cooperative Games

A global (cooperative) game describes the utility that the whole set of players generates depending on the coalition structure they form. These games were introduced by Gilboa and Lehrer (1991) who proposed and characterized a generalization of the Shapley value. We introduce two families of point valued solutions that contain the Gilboa-Lehrer value. We characterize each family by means of reasonable properties, which are related to the ones used by Gilboa and Lehrer

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Year of publication:	[2023]
Authors:	Alonso-Meijide, José María ; Alvarez-Mozos, Mikel ; Fiestras-Janeiro, M. Gloria ; Jiménez-Losada, Andrés
Publisher:	[S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Kooperatives Spiel \| Cooperative game \| Theorie \| Theory \| Shapley-Wert \| Shapley value \| Transferierbarer Nutzen \| Transferable utility

Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (24 p)
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	10.2139/ssrn.4441857 [DOI]
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014357095