Two kinds of voting procedures manipulability: Strategic voting and strategic nomination

In this paper the concepts of manipulation as strategic voting (misrepresentation of true preferences) and strategic nomination (by adding, or removing alternatives) are investigated. The connection between Arrow's and Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorems is discussed from the viewpoint of dilemma between dictatorship and manipulability.

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Year of publication:	2015
Authors:	Turnovec, František
Publisher:	Prague : Charles University in Prague, Institute of Economic Studies (IES)
Subject:	arrow's theorem \| dictatorship \| Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem \| manipulation \| Pareto efficiency \| strategic voting \| strategic nomination

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Series:	IES Working Paper ; 11/2015
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	82675337X [GVK] hdl:10419/120441 [Handle]
Classification:	D71 - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011340634