Two-person ex post implementation

This paper investigates the ex post implementation of a social choice set with two agents. A social choice set F is ex post implementable with two agents if F satisfies the conditions of ex post incentive compatibility (EPIC) and ex post monotonicity (EM) in an environment that is economic and has a bad outcome. Furthermore, if F is a social choice function, (EPIC), (EM), and an economic environment are sufficient.

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Year of publication:	2012
Authors:	Ohashi, Yoshihiro
Published in:	Games and Economic Behavior. - Elsevier, ISSN 0899-8256. - Vol. 75.2012, 1, p. 435-440
Publisher:	Elsevier
Subject:	Implementation \| Ex post equilibrium \| Two-person

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Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

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