Tying Contracts and Asymmetric Information

Tying contracts are well-known for their anti-competitive potential. This paper questions their negative image by showing that tying contracts can be necessary to implement price signals which overcome problems of asymmetric information in the introductory phase of a new durable product. The argument is applied to two antitrust cases against tying arrangements, the German Meto case and the US Amercian SCM case.

MoreLess

Year of publication:	1998
Authors:	Kamecke, Ulrich
Published in:	Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE). - ISSN 0932-4569. - Vol. 154.1998, 3, p. 531-531

More details

Extent:	text/html
Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	L15 - Information and Product Quality; Standardization and Compatibility ; L42 - Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005581986