Unanimity Rule Constitutions

In this paper, we show that the shortcomings of the unanimity rule can be alleviated by complementing it with the following constitutional principles: broad packages with many public projects can only be proposed once in a legislative term, the agenda setter needs to pay the highest taxes he is proposing, as well as a ban on subsidies. We show that such democratic constitutions yield efficient public project provision.

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Year of publication:	2000-08-04
Authors:	Gersbach, Hans ; Erlenmaier, Ulrich
Institutions:	EconWPA
Subject:	Unanimity rule \| incomplete social contract \| constitutional treatment rules \| provision of public projects

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Public Economics.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	Type of Document - Tex; prepared on UNIX ; to print on PostScript; pages: 16; figures: . 16 pages
Classification:	D62 - Externalities ; D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legistures, and Voting Behavior ; H40 - Publicly Provided Goods. General
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005412479