Uncertainty, Pay for Performance, and Asymmetric Information

This article develops a new rationale for the emergence of pay-for-performance contracts where the labor market is competitive, workers are risk averse, and firms are risk neutral and unaware of workers' productivities. The article shows that the prevalence of pay for performance rises and the pay-for-performance sensitivity falls as environmental uncertainty increases. This empirical regularity is unaccounted for alternative models such as the standard agency model

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Year of publication:	2010
Authors:	Balmaceda, Felipe
Publisher:	[2010]: [S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Asymmetrische Information \| Asymmetric information \| Leistungsentgelt \| Performance pay \| Theorie \| Theory \| Risikopräferenz \| Risk attitude \| Risiko \| Risk
Description of contents:	Abstract [papers.ssrn.com]

Extent:	1 Online-Ressource
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	In: The Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, Vol. 25, Issue 2, pp. 400-441, 2009 Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments October 2009 erstellt Volltext nicht verfügbar
Classification:	D86 - Economics of Contract: Theory ; L2 - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior ; M5 - Personnel Economics ; J3 - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013150889