UNIFORM CONTINUITY OF THE VALUE OF ZERO-SUM GAMES WITH DIFFERENTIAL INFORMATION

We establish uniform continuity of the value for zero-sum games with differential information, when the distance between changing information fields of each player is measured by the Boylan (1971) pseudo-metric. We also show that the optimal strategy correspondence is upper semicontinuous when the information fields of players change, even with the weak topology on players' strategy sets.

MoreLess

Year of publication:	2004-03
Authors:	Einy, Ezra ; Haimanko, Ori ; Moreno, Diego ; Shitovitz, Benyamin
Institutions:	Departamento de Economía, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid

More details

Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Economics Working Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10005249759