Uniformly strict equilibrium for repeated games with private monitoring and communication
Richard McLean, Ichiro Obara, Andrew Postlewaite
| Year of publication: |
October 2023
|
|---|---|
| Authors: | MacLean, Richard P. ; Obara, Ichiro ; Postlewaite, Andrew |
| Publisher: |
Philadelphia, PA : Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania |
| Subject: | Cheap Talk | Communication | Folk theorem | Private monitoring | Repeated games | Robustness | Strict Equilibrium | Wiederholte Spiele | Kommunikation | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Folk-Theorem | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Gleichgewichtsmodell | Equilibrium model | Gleichgewichtstheorie | Equilibrium theory |
freely available
| Extent: | 1 Online-Ressource (circa 21 Seiten) |
|---|---|
| Series: | Working papers / Penn Institute for Economic Research. - Philadelphia, Penn., ZDB-ID 2405838-5. - Vol. 23, 018 |
| Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Graue Literatur ; Non-commercial literature ; Arbeitspapier ; Working Paper |
| Language: | English |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014448449